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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ANGELO RA YARINO,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.HARRY PRICE, JR., and MRS.
HARRY PRICE, JR., his wife, and
MRS. MARCUS PARR, also known
as ARLINDA PRICE PARR,

Case No. 7882

Defendants and A ptJellants.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLAN:TS
EXCEPTION TO PLAINTIFF'S
STATEMENT· OF' FACT
Appellants except strenuously to the statement of
facts presented in respondent's brief. It is to be observed.
at. the outset that such statement of facts is very brief
1
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and only spottedly supported by reference to the record.
Respondent, in his statement of facts and throughout the brief, continually refers to Harry Price "assenting to a deal" and make it appear that the deal is the
same cash transaction as resulted in this judgment of
specific performance. This is not the case. When their
witness refers to such assent it was assent to the trade
and not to the terms of Exhibit "E." Nobody ever discussed Exhibit "E" with Harrry Price. 'See appellants'
brief, P. 26, et. seq., for evdience as to this.
This case can be reduced to this simple proposition
which the statement of facts of respondent completely
disregards. These are briefly this :
A refuses to sell his property for cash. B desires
A's property, so a trade is arranged between A and C and
a sale by C to A. For some reason the trade between A
and C cannot be consummated, the reason being imInaterial. Is A nevertheless required to convey his property to C for cash~ The answer to this question, both
legally and equitably, is obviously "no."
Under these facts referred to which is this case the
conveyance by A is conditional on the reception by him
of C's property. In other words, there is no obligation
upon A to convey until C's property is conveyed to him.
The statement of facts of respondent as made in hi::;
brief would make it appear that there was no such trade
or three-cornered arrangement under the evidence presented at the trial herein, and, for this reason, the fol·
2
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lowing testin1ony is presented to this court which conclusiYely shows that there was such an arrangement, and
that every witness who te~tified ~o understood it.
At the time of the trial, Hansen intimates that it
was a direct sale by Price to Ravarino, the purchase
price to be paid by Prices to ~Iollerups for the l\iollerup
property. This, however, was not the understanding of
anybody connected with this transaction, and warping
the matter in this manner seriously prejudices the Prices,
both tax-wise and in the forn1 the~· desire their assets
to be, i.e., forces then1 to take cash instead of real estate.
In view of the fact that re:'pondent in his statement
of facts represents that the matter was not a three-way
transaction, a few n1ore excerpts frmn the record should
be helpful. :Jir. Hansen in his deposition and at the
trial has testified under oath as follows (R. 104):

"Q.

Now, on this deal that is involved here, it was
a strict trade, was it not? It was a threeway proposition front the beginning?
"A. That's right."
(R. 105)
"Q. And the Prices conveying was dependent
upon receiving the ~.follerup property first 1
"A. Yes, it was one deal.
"Q. One deal~
"A. That's right."
Ravarino also knew a trade was involved. Hansen
testified as follows (R. 136) :
''Q. But he (Ravarino) knew about the trade~
"A. He did later, but-
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"A.

"Q.
"A.
"Q.
"A.
"Q.

Yes, he knew we were trying to negotiate a
trade.
And he knew there had to be a trade before
the Prices would convey~
Yes, I think heYou told him-you and :Mr. Rich told him,
did you not, at one time in your office1
Over here in the office of the 0 P A.
But you knew that Mr. Ravarino was told
that~

"A. Yes, we were working out a trade."
Mr. Rich also testifies to the same (R. 156):
"Q. Then when the final deal came, the down payment was to be of the Price property instead
of the cash~
"A. That's right."
All doubt is removed as to the nature of this deal by
papers presented to Prices to conclude the transaction.
The real estate contract wherein Prices' trade with Mollerup does not say that there is to be a cash payment,
but does say this after providing for monthly payments
(Exhibit "F"):
"• • • as additional payment for said property the said buyers have tran~ferred to the said
sellers by warranty deed certain real estate in
Block 31, Plat A, Salt Lake City Survey, as described in a copy of said warranty deed attached
hereto and made a part hereof."
This warranty deed is Exhibit "H."
Referring to these exhibits, Mr. Ben Rich, who was
an independent witness, had this to say (R. 155) :

"Q. And these documents, they are the deeds and
4
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various things you testified you had drawn
that affected the proposition in accordance
with your instructions 1
"A. Fron1 ~lr. Hansen, yes sir.'"
~Ir.

Schluter, the banker who appraised the Moilerup and Price property, testifies as to his understanding
of the transaction contemplated by the parties, as follows
(R. 222):

''Q. Did you appraise any routes next to or adjacent to the Price warehouse ?
"A. No, that wasn't in the tradf~."
(R. 224)
''Q. She wanted to know what they should get
for their property?
"A. She wanted my valuation of the property
they were trading and also my valuation of
the !follerup deal."
(R. 225)
"Q. Did they show you any Earnest Money Receipt at that time?
"A. No, nothing had been signed to n1y knowledge
at that time. They were merely concerned
with the trade at the time they asked me to
appraise both properties."

H. L. Mulliner testified (R. 230) :
"Mr. I-Iansen called me at least twice to ask
me if Harry had decided to go through on the deal
and that he had better make up his mind right
away because he said first he thought they had
another purchaser if he wasn't going to take the
( Mollerup) property."
and further :
"My purpose in this, Your Honor, is to show
5
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that at this late of a date, Mr. Hansen and Mr.
Rich were still trying to get the Prices to accept
the Mollerup deal."
The testimony of Edgar C. Jensen with regard to
this transaction is highly important and entitled to considerable weight in view of his relation with the parties.
He had been, and was at the tin1e these matters arose,
the attorney for Mr. Hansen (R. 210) and had known
him for a number of years. The reading of his testimony
shows beyond question that he tried to be as fair as
possible.
Mr. Jensen testified that his understanding of this
transaction and knowledge thereof was obtained through
Mr. Price and through Mr. Hansen and that the only
transaction contemplated was a trade of the Price property for the Mollerup property, and that Ravarino's
name was never mentioned, nor was a cash sale considered (R. 207, 208, 213, 214, 215). No documents involving Ravarino were submitted to him for approval
in behalf of the Prices.
In addition to the testimony quoted above by the independent witnesses, we have the positive statements
of the various defendants that the transaction involved
a trade. Everything in this case. points conclusively
to the fact that the conveyance by the Prices was condi·tioned upon their receiving the Mollerup property. If
this were not so, why should half of this record and half
of respondent's brief be concerned with the Mollerup
real estate~
6
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Ben Rich, a wi tnes~ railed by respondent, testif1ed
unequivocally that a trade wa:;; involved and even went
so far as to sub1nit a hypothetical case to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue which a~sun1ed the san1e facts a~ he
thought existed as between ~Iollerup and I >rice, and
whirh are the san1e fact~ propounded here hy defendants.
The question of eredibility of witness now become
important in view of the position taken by respondent
in his brief. Lewis Hansen is the only witness who sustains in any manner the position of respondent in this action. He was successfully impeached by Edgar C. Jensen
(R. 206, 210, 212) and H. L. :Jlulliner (R. 227, 228, 232,
233). He was flatly contradicted by the plaintiff. His
sworn statements taken during his deposition and even
at the trial are contradictory as can be seen from the
following examples :
As indicated above, he had no aversion, prior to
the trial and while under oath, to speaking of this transaction as a trade between l\lollerup and Price, or a threeway deal, or that Prices' receiving the ltf ollerup property
was a condition to the transfer of their own property
(R. 104, 105, 133).
Another example is that when his deposition was
taken, he testified that Exhibit "1~" and "J" were not
signed at the same time and they obviously were not.
(R. 112)
"Q. But they weren't executed simultaneously1
"A. No, not the same time.

7
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"Q. Exhibit 2 signed one day and Exhibit 3 signed
another day?
"A. Well, I made them both the same day, but
it was right close in there."
At the trial he testified that both were signed simultaneously ( R. 110) in the coffee shop by Mrs. Price.
Another example: In his deposition when asked
whether Ravarino knew about the trade while negotiations were going on, he answered (R. 110): "Yes, he knew
we were trying to negotiate a trade." On the trial he
testified that Ravarino did not know about a trade until
long after October 5.
Another example: In his deposition (R. 126) Mr.
Hansen testified that he could have told Mrs~ Price that
Ravarino had bought the Terry property prior to October 5th. The fact that he did is confirmed by Mr.
Schluter's testimony (R. 221, 222, 224). He denies this
at the triaL
Another example: His testimony at the trial is completely contradictory as to whether a copy of Exhibit "E"
was delivered to Mrs. Price. The fact of the matter is
that H. L. Mulliner had to. procure a photostatic copy
of Exhibit "E" after the suit was filed in order to find
out what it contained. More will be stated on this later.
This subject is particularly interesting and the Court is
referred to the following instances of Hansen's testifying on this subject with the varying results. At P. 81
of the record, Hansen testifies that Mrs. Price would
have one and Ravarino would have one. At P. 96, line
8
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27, he testifies I-Iarry had n copy of Exhibit "E." At P.
11-1, 115, he testifies he didn •t give l\1 r~. Price a eopy.
At P. ~37, he testifies that he rlid not give a ropy of Exhibit "E.' to :Jf r~. Price.
If Harry Price had ever ~een Exhibit .. E," he would
have had to see the copy given l\Ir:-:;. Prire, if she was ever
given one, because Hansen testified Harry had never
seen Exhibit "E" or been m~ked to sig·n it (R. R:2, 96).
There is also a very interesting thing connected with
this Exhibit ••E'' which bears heavily on the interest
of Lewis Hansen in this action. In the first place, there
was no reason whatsoevet, in view of the way the transaction was set up, for having an Earnest :Money Receipt
wherein the Prices appear as Seller and Ravarino appears as Buyer. The original Earnest Money herein executed on August 8th by Ravarino anticipated a cash
sale for $18,000.00, and if this was the agreement as contended for by respondent all that would have been necessary was that the Prices sign the agreement already executed by Ravarino (Exhibit 2). This, however, was not
done.
Subsequently, according to Hansen, he raised the
price to $19,000.00 and Exhibit "E" was signed. Mrs.
Parr and Mrs. Price stoutly maintain that the blanks
were not filled in when they signed it. Their version
of this would see1n to be correct in view of the fact, as
was pointed out in our original brief, P. 84 et seq. :Mrs.
Price was well versed enough in business matters so
that she would not agree to convey her property to Mol9
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lerup and at the same time agree to convey her property
to Ravarino.
Notwithstanding that the price Ravarino was willing
to pay had been increased to $19,000.00, the deeds and
contracts of sale, Exhibit "F," were drawn with the
understanding that the Price property was to be taken
in for $18,000.00 of the $35,000.00 purchase price, leaving
a balance of $17,000.00 payable. In such event, the $1,000.00 difference between $18,000.00 and $19,000.00
should have been paid in cash by Hansen to the Prices.
Now here in this record is there any intimation that this
was to be done or was even considered by Hansen.

So, if on October 19th the Prices and Mrs. Parr had
signed Exhibit "F," Hansen would have paid Mollerup
$18,000.00 of Ravarino's money for a deed from Mollerup
and retained $1,000.00 for himself. This is the only reason why Exhibit uE" was ever executed. This conclusion
is confirmed again by the fact that Exhibit "E," or a
copy thereof, was never furnished the defendants.
This fact of Hansen's gaining $1,000.00 also indicates his interest in having this deal closed. This fact
is further confirmed by the fact that when the final
papers to consummate this transaction were tendered to
defendants, there is not one of such documents made in
pursuance of the execution of Exhibit "E" or to carry
out its terms according to its provisions. This fact is
confirmed 'again by the inconsistent position that Hansen
was placed in and illustrated by the conflicting and contradictory statements he has made during the course of
10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the preparation and trial of this case, a few examples
of 'vhich were set out hereinabove.
It is a Yery difficult thing for plaintiff to explain
why, if Exhibit "E'' is to remain effective, that the final
papers which were to be executed disregarded totally
everything that is contained in Exhibit "E." Respondent
attempts to do this by saying that this method of closing the transaction was done only for the "eonvenienee"
of defendants.
In these days, the tax consequences of any business
transaction, and particularly transfers of real estate, are
of prime significance to the parties involved. This is
common knowledge and the tax effect largely determines
whether business can be done and in every case how it
should be done. To label this feature a "convenienee"
is the ultimate in understatement.
It is also a fact that persons who own property
are entitled in their dealing with it to retain such property in the form they desire. Defendants obviously and
admittedly desired their assets to remain in the form
of income-producing property rather than cash. This
is not a "convenience."

The judgment of the trial Court deprives these defendants of these two rights to which they are entitled
by enforcing an Earnest Money Receipt which was never
intended to represent the transaction involved in this
case by anybody who had anything to do with it.
11
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---------------========c--- Finally, the existence of estoppel as against Harry
Price, or the factual situation as contended for by respondent, can conclusively be shown not to exist by the
following example:
Assume that on October 13th, the day upon which
the final paper were presented, that Mollerup had not
signed them and that the transaction as presented to
the Prices and Mrs. Parr was executed by them. Next,
assume that when these documents were presented to
Mollerup, he refused to sign the contract and deed to
Ravarino. Could Ravarino insist that Exhibit "E" be
given effect as against the Prices~ The answer is quite
obviously no. Yet, the Prices and Mrs. Parr would have
performed according to the "deal."
There is, however, no difference in principle between
the fictitious situation presented above and that involved
in this case. In both instances the contentional factor
of the Mollerup trade failed to materialize and yet the
trial Court did grant specific performance under the
terms of Exhibit "E." A rule of law or equity which
would make this distinction between the fictitious case
stated above and the one which actually existed is wholly
without logic and reason. In neither case can the elements of estoppel be made out. This example shall be
referred to when each of respondent's points are discussed hereinafter.
In other words, it is submitted that if the Prices and
Mrs. Parr had signed and Mollerup failed to perform
there could be no possible liability on the part of the

12
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Prices and Parr to Ravarino and that the same contentions and rules of law and equity should be applied in
the instant case.

POINT I.
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AS MADE ARE
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

Respondent continually refers to the fact that no
objection to the findings of the trial Court was or IS
being 1nade by appellants. This is not ~-· ..e case.
Appellants at the time of the trial and in this Court
insist that the findings of fact in this case should be that
a trade between Mollerup and Price and a sale by l\follerup to Ravarino represents the true facts, and that any
conveyance therefor, by Prices and ~Irs. Parr, w·as conditioned upon a receipt by them of the l\Iollerup property.
Appellants feel their position is sound in this respect because every person who testified in this case
represented to the trial Court that this was the exact
situation, except ~{r. Hansen, and Mr. Hansen upon his
deposition testified to the same, so we have a condition
here where every witness at a trial has testified to a set
of facts, under oath, at one ti1ne or another, and the trial
Court has completely disregarded such testimony.
If this testimony had been followed it would have
been absolutely unnecessary to lnake the findings on the
evidentiary matter~ contained in Point I of respondent's
brief, under Sub-sections a, b, c, and d. All of these findings in the sub-sections are mere recitals of evidence

13
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and are not findings on the issues raised by the pleadings
and evidence in this action.
The issue squarely presented to the trial Court was:
a. Whether the transaction as a whole constituted
a three-way deal including Prices, Mollerups and Ravarino, whereby the conveyance by Prices and Parr was
conditioned upon them receiving the Mollerup property,
or
b. vVhether there was an outright contract of sale,
the terms of which were understood by all involved,
whereby Prices agreed to sell for $19,000.00 cash to
Ravarino. In this connection it is important to note that
not one person, even Hansen, testified in support of this
set of facts and yet the Court, by injecting a number of
immaterial findings, reaches this conclusion.
The portion of appellants' brief directed to this problem is found at Page 60, where it is argued that the
lower Court's decision is contrary to all the evidence.
The foregoing portions of this brief have been devoted
to further illustrate this.
':l_1he law in such situation is set out in our original
brief commencing at Page 60. Respondent does not controve-rt this law or argue it; nor does he attempt to
answer the factual argument made there; nor does he
contend that the law is different from that which is Ret
out.
Under sub-section I-a of respondent's brief, it is
argued that the signatures of the women upon Exhibit
14
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"E" were not conditioned upon the signature of Harry
Price.
The n1ere state1nen t of their claim in this respect is
not supported by any evidence in this ease. 'rhere wa~
no "assent" to the terms of Exhibit ··E." The only "assent" was to the trade.
On this particular feature of evidence, the Court's
attention is also directed to the fact that Thf r. Hanson told
Ed Jensen that the signatures on this exhibit were made
conditionally. See the record at 209, 210 and 212.
The matter of these signatures being conditional
is not of any special importance in this case except to indicate uncertainty in Exhibit "E." The important thing
is whether a conveyance hy the Prices was conditional
upon their receipt of the ~Iollerup property. This is the
issue upon which a finding of fact should have been
made by the Court.
The argument of respondent in support of his Point
No. I-a will now be referred to. It is interesting to note
that on August 8th, it is admitted that Rava.rino's offer
of $18,000.00 for the Price property was declined, and
then Hansen started showing the Prices other property.
If no trade was involved, why was it necessary for Hansen to proceed further in showing properties to the defendants1
The next argument is contained in the last paragraph of Page 17 of respondent's brief. This is presented
as a statement of fact and consists of a verbatim state-

15
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ment of Hansen as to what occurred in the coffee shop
on 'September 21st. This statement is to the effect that
Hansen raised the price of the Prices' property $1,000.00
and reduced the price of the Mollerup property from
$36,000.00 to $35,000.00, at which time Mrs. Price signed
it. This statement is almost fantastic in view of what
transpired later, especially when the Price property on
the final closing was valued at $18,000.00 under all the
evidence in this case. Also, Ravarino did not authorize
Hansen to pay $19,000.00 until October 5th.
However, if any truth at all can be attributed to this
statement of Hansen's, it still must be conceded that the
Prices conveying their property to anyone was dependent upon their receiving Mollerup's property. By this
statement of Hansen, he concedes this and it is further
confirmed by the fact that he drew up the final papers
along this line, with the exception that $18,000.00 was
to be allowed instead of $19,000.00.
If such a conversation took place, Mrs. Price would
surely have seen that at some time in the proceeding she
received credit for $19,000.00, but even IIansen cannot
state that she made such a claim.
On Page 18, the statement is made that when Mrs.
Parr came into Hansen's office she signed "E" and "J"
without question and ~fr. Hansen denied making any
representations whatsoever to her. Page 82 of the record
is quoted in support of this. There is nothing at Page
82 that even suggests such a thing. lvfr. Hansen states
that he had no conversation that he could remember

16
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with ~Irs. Parr (R. 84). Cmnpare the testilnony of Mrs.
Parr as to this signing. \\""ith the fact in ulind that thi~
was probably the only real estate transaction she had
ever engaged in, nothing to the contrary appears. r:rhis
testimony conunences at the bottmn of Page 188 and is
as logical and sounding in truth as it could possibly be.
Further, it is completely consistent with Hansen's testimony that from the beginning these people were not interested in cash at all.
In the same paragraph it is asserted that the "whole
thing was explained to ~[r. Price by l\Irs. Price." And the
record is quoted at Pages 83 and 84. This is quite interesting. .Jir. Burton i::; trying to direct Mr. Hansen's
attention to a purported telephone call made to Mr.
Price by Mr. Hansen, between the time Mrs. Price signed
Exhibit "E" and 1\t!rs. Parr signed Exhibit "E." Hansen
stated "he was perfectly fine about it, he seemed anxious," then the next two answers he obviously refers to
the time (August 8th) when the $18,000.00 cash offer
contained in Exhibit "2" was declined.
This is one of the clearest examples 1n Hansen's
testimony of the erratic 1nanner and flippancy which
characterizes his testimony.
It is next argued that there was some effort by the
women to require .J[ollerup to perfonn. As has been indicated, if Harry Price knew that just the warehouse wa:-;
to be transferred and $17,000.00, without interest, was
to be made in in:-;talhnents, he probal)ly would have

17
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signed. This is the unde-rstanding the women had and
thought they could enforce.
Respondent, in the last paragraph on Page 19 of his
brief, argued that it is:
"Clear and convincing, and the evidence is
overwhelming. That when Exhibit "E" and "J'~
were signed by the two women they intended to
be bound and they intended to perform the transaction according to the terms of Exhibit "E."
There is absolutely no evidence in this case of such
a fact, not even from Hansen. The positive testimony
of the women is that by their signing they were authorizing some negotiations (R. 189, 185, 191). It is ridiculous to make this foregoing statement because if they
signed "E" and "J" why did they not intend to be bound
by "E" and "J" and not just "E." Hansen does not even
maintain this. Their final contention en this point is contained at Page 21 where the bald assertion is made that
Exhibit "E" "is the agreen1ent of the parties." If this is
the case and the intention of the parties, why did Mr.
Hansen proceed to draw the real estate contract and the
deeds in the manner he did, which gave no effect whatsoever to the terms contained in Exhibit "E," but gave
full effect to Exhibit "J"? See the discussion of the factual situation on this point in our brief, P. 85 et seq.
Assuming that the above quoted statement made by
respondent is true and that the won1en did intend to be
bound by Exhibits "E" and "J," and which, in fact, they
did if Exhibit "E" conformed to their intention, why
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should they be bound anyn1ore by Exhibit ''E" than they
should be by Exhibit '•J"f And why should they intend
to perform Exhibit "'E" rather than to perform Exhibit
"J" '? This staten1ent of respondent points more clearly
than anything else in hi~ brief to the fallacy of their
argument and indicate~ beyond any question that the
theory of appellants, that Exhibit ":B~" was not the contract to be perfonned, is that which is overwhelmingly
supported by this record.
The next argument under Point I of respondent's
brief, sub-section (b), is that Exhibit "E" was filled in
and in its present fonn, with thr exception of signatures,
at the time it was signed by the women. The fact that it
was not so filled in can be demonstrated beyond any
reasonable doubt. First, it is highly unlikely that Mrs.
Price, a person who is charged with considerable busineRs
acumen by respondent in his brief, would sit down with
~Ir. Hansen and sign off her property to two different
individuals at the same time. There was also the fact that
Mrs. Price says that this positively was not done andrecalls specific social incidents connecterl with her Rigning
this document.
The following review of the situation will also tend
to confirm the fact that this was not done. On the date
that Exhibit "E" and "J" bear, these two women anticipated a trade of their property for the Mollerup property. It would, therefore, seem natural that they should
sign two memorandums: one to agree to take the Mollerup property, the other one would be to agree to
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convey their property to Mollerup.
If the name of Mollerup had been inserted in Exhibit
"E," the intention of these women and the intention
of everyone connected with this case would have been
carried out, and upon this intention being carried out
the documents presented to them at the final closing
would have been in accordance with the Earnest Money
Receipts these women signed rather than in conflict with
them.
The most conclusive evidence in this case of the fact
that this Exhibit "E" was not filled in, is the fact that no
copies of this Exhibit, in its present form, were seen or
presented to any of the defendants. Their only knowledge of it, according to their testimony, was when it was
attached to the original pleading in this case. As indicated, their counsel procured a copy from the attorney
for plaintiff after the suit was filed. None was attached
to defendants' copy of the complaint.
This Exhibit was purportedly signed on September
21st, and around the 19th of October, Hansen, Rich, and
the Prices had their conference. At this conference, and
as indicated by the closing papers, the price of the Mollerup property was $35,000.00 and Prices were not to
receive $19,000.00 credit, but to receive $18,000.00 credit
and agree to pay a $17,000.00 balance. Now, if Mrs. Price
or Harry Price had seen Exhibit "E," they would have
insisted that there can be only a $16,000.00 balance or
that they receive $1,000.00 cash. If either of the Prices
20
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had known $19,000.00 were involved on Exhibit "E,"
or anyone else, they would have insisted on their receiving credit for it, but they were not aware of this
figure until the suit wa~ filed and a copy furnished.
It is also a fact that if the Prices had seen Exhibit
··:c·· and the figure $19,000.00 on it, the plan of Hansen
to obtain an extra $1,000.00 for hin1self could not have
been carried out hy him.
There is another interesting fact developed by the
testimony of the won1en (R. 191). This is that the women
were as familiar with these lot nmnbers as they could
possibly be. If Exhibit "E" had been filled in and in its
present condition showing a sale of the premises at 235
\Vest 5th South, either of them would have caught this
mistake because 235 is the small house and 225 is the
warehouse which they thought they were trading.
The argument of respondent in his brief on this
point is as brief as it is lacking in support from this
Record. The final statement is made in this form from
page 23:
"They had been discussing this transaction
with Hansen for several weeks; particularly ~irs.
Price was fully aware of every detail includin~
a description of the property and the fact that
defendants were receiving $19,000.00 in cash."
The Court in reading this Record will not find one
word of evidence from anyone who testifies including
Hansen that it was their intention that Prices receive
$19,000.00 cash. Every person who testified except Han-
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sen stated that the Prices were not to receive cash and
Hansen drew the papers which provided that Price receive credit of $18,000.00 for their property on a trade
and not $19,000.00 which conclusively indicates the intention of Hansen.
Throughout the argument on this point, it is repeatedly stated again and again that the women and Harry
Price assented and were aware of a deal. The "assent"
and "deal" were a trade with Mollerup and to this extent, such statements are true, but are used completely
out of context.
The next argument of plaintiff is I-c where the contention is made that Ravarino purchased the Terry strip
upon reliance of Harry Price's promise to complete the
transaction. Such contention does not make any sense
whatsoever unless the term "transaction" has a meaning.
Not even Hansen, while making some of his wildest statements, testified that Harry Price assented to a cash sale
of his property for $19,000.00. The transaction above referred to is the three-way deal. Harry Price under Hansen's. testimony, never saw Exhibit "E" and it appears
that he was not aware of such a document until this case
was filed. How then can it be said, as it is on Page 23
of respondent's brief, that he accepted, ratified, and acknowledged Exhibit "E," yet this is incorporated in the
Findings of F'act. Even under Hansen's testimony, any
assent given by :Harry Price was assent to the trade arrangement as drawn up by Hansen and not assent to a
22
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document which he never saw, knew of', or the tenus of
which were not incorporated in such transactions.
The matter of the Mollerup mortgage and of Mollerup needing $5,000.00 i~ next arg·ued b~· respondent.
The statement that:
""Harry Price saw no reason after his conversation with Hansen why Hansen could not
turn over to Mollerup $5,000.00 of the $18,000.00
which was going frmn Ravarino to defendants."
has absolutely no foundation or support in this evidence
at all. Harry Price's cmnments with regard to this matter, if it was ever brought to his attention, indicate clearly that he had no money coming and that if Mollerup was
in need of funds he should talk to Ravarino or Hansen,
who was his representative and who was holding Ravorino's money pending the payn1ent of it to Mollerup.
A startling example of respondent's tactics in trying
to confuse this Court on this matter is contained at the
top of Page 30 of his brief where the following statement
is made:
"Ravarino purchased the Terry property immediately following the conversation. He gave
Hansen $19,000.00 at the same time, clearly indicating that he believed, with Price, that the bargain was complete, that only the detail of obtaining the deed remained."
By this statement he is trying to make the Court believe
that a deed from Prices and Parr to Ravarino was to be
executed. There is absolutely no emdence in this case
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from anyone that this was to be done. The deed referred
to, if any good faith is to be attributed to this statement,
is the deed from Prices and Parr to Mollerup.
In the argument commencing at Page 30 of his brief,
Section 1-d, plaintiff argues that both of the lots of defendants on 5th South were included in the transaction.
Harry Price so understood it. The women obviously did
not. Our contention in this respect is that if such a misunderstanding exists, no specific performance can be
granted. See law cited in our opening brief at Pages 81
and 93.
In view of the fact that Ravarino purchased only the
right of way to the rear of the warehouse indicates
strongly that it was his understanding that only the
warehouse was to be traded.
Point is made by respondent that no objection
was raised to these descriptions at the meeting in Hansen's office. There is no evidence that these descriptions
were ever discussed or that Mrs. Price ever read the
papers at this meeting.
The important matter with regard to this argument
is that, commencing at Page 81 of Point IV of our original brief, we show that if there is any question about these
things, and there obviously is, specific performance
should not be granted. Respondent's brief is silent, both
factually and as to law, on this matter, and we think,
therefore, that our position should be sustained inasmuch as it is not challenged.
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The argu1nent of Section 1-e, at Page 32 of respondent's brief, is that the trial Court's findings on conflicting
evidence should not be disturbed. Our contention in this
respect, however, is that the trial Court 1nisapplied the
facts and the evidence recited in the trial Court's findings
of fact is not supported by the record. A careful reading
of this record will show thi~ to he the case.

The important thing to remember in discussing this
argument is that under Points I, II, III, and IV raised
in our brief there is no conflict in the evidence. Under
Point I we have argued that there was no legally enforceable contract in this case and the facts recited to illustrate this under this section of our brief are admitted
on all sides.
The same is true of Point II of our brief. Hansen's
testimony does not effect the legal and factual propositions expounded there.
This is equally true of Points III and IV. Our contentions on these points are unchallenged by respondent
and should, therefore, be sustained.
The point is, that if the testilnony of Hansen is
assumed to be true, his version of this transaction will
not sustain the order of this Court. In addition to this,
we point out, that his testimony is such that it should
not be believed. It is indeed difficult to understand why
Hansen should be allowed to testify to matters diametrically opposed to his acts and conduct, and that such testimony should be incorporated in findings of fact. The
law is otherwise, as indicated in our brief.
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The Court is directed to the fact that this trial took
place in the middle of September, 1951. The memorandum
decision was in January, 1952, and the arguments thereon did not take place until May of 1952.
The findings of fact themselves do not indicate a
simple cash sale of real estate. If this were the case they
would not be near as lengthy as they are. Nor are they
very carefully drawn. The attention of the Court is directed to the following in this regard:
Paragraph 5 of the findings of fact has to do with
a rejected offer and is of no materiality.
Paragraph 6 states that Harry Price was notified
of the Earnest Money R~ceipt, Exhibit "E," and that he
indicated the terms were acceptable. There is no evidence
in this record to support such a finding and if there had
been the Court would have admitted Exhibit "E" in evidence as against Harry Price, which was not done. Further on in the same paragraph the statement is made that
Exhibit "E" was signed by Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr
with Harry Price's knowledge. This is admittedly incorrect.
In this same paragraph it is stated that Ravarino
paid $19,000.00 to Hansen two or three days after Exhibit "E" was signed. Under plaintiff's evidence it was
two weeks or more.
The last paragraph of findings of fact No. 6 is
absolutely without support in the evidence. Hansen testified on two occasions, as has been indicated previously,
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that the Prices did not get a copy of Exhibit "E" and, as
has been indicated time and again, what plaintiff contends is Harry Price's knowledge of an I;~arnest Money
Receipt is not Exhibit "E" but Exhibit "2." There isn't
any question about this. Now here does Hansen say that
price was an1enable to Exhibit ··E." He hedges by saying
he was agreeable to a deal which everybody understood
was a trade.
The material matters in Paragraph 8 are totally
without support in this record. This finding states baldly
that plaintiff paid Hansen $19,000.00 and requested
a deed fromPrices and }.Irs. Parr to Ravarino. It is admitted and this record can be searched in vain for one
word of evidence where any request, demand or anything of such a nature was made to the Prices or Mrs.
Parr for such a deed.
This same criticism can be Inade of Paragraph 10.
The fact that plaintiff can and does contend for in its
brief is that Harry Price might have given somebody
some 'assurance he would go through with the trade as
Hansen says, but nowhere did he ever, nor is there any
evidence that he told anybody that he would convey
in accordance with Exhibit "E."
In Paragraph 12 of the findings, plaintiff lapses into
the same language difficulties he carries on in his brief,
wherein it is found:
"Harry Price again indicated the en tire
transaction and proposed conveyance was satisfactory."
27
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Did plaintiff or the trial Court in this finding mean
that the conveyance was in conformity with Exhibit "E,"
and since when is a simple sale of real estate entitled
to be cl·assed "the entire transaction~"
Again in this Paragraph 12 is a further illustration
of the carelessness present in the drawing of these findings, where it is stated that Mr. and Mrs. Price met to
complete the signing and payment of monies. Prices were
never to pay any money, and the only signing contemplated was a deed from Prices to Mollerup and a Real
Estate Contract with Mollerup as the other party.
This finding then goes on to say that they refused
to execute the Warranty Deed which had been prepared.
Is the Warranty Deed referred to a Warranty Deed to
Ravarino. The answer is admittedly no. Yet, as previously indicated in Paragraph 8, the intimation is that the
deed was to be drawn to him. In addition, it may be
added, that the findings, conclusion and judgment
awards attorney's fees of $1,000.00 as against Harry
Price, which counsel for plaintiff has admitted, on the
presentation of a recent motion, is wrong.
We maintained in our main brief that the documents
tell the whole story and the language of these findings of
fact, if referable to the evidence in this case, conclusively
points to this proposition as being true. The documents,
deeds and transfers referred to therein in the evidence
as recited mean the documents presented to Prices and
at this trial and fully confirm the position of appellants
in this respect and refute the findings.
28
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The docun1ents referred to 1nean the final documents
which n1ust, of necessity, indieate what the transaction
was. ~\t Page 34, respondent states that we maintain
that docu1nents tell the whole story and then criticize us
by arguing that :Mrs. Price and 1\lrs. Parr contradict
and dispute Exhibit ··E." Our argument remains sound
because Exhibit .. E" has nothing to do with this transaction as planned and intended and worked out by every
person connected with it.
POIN"T II.
EXHIBIT "E" WAS NOT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE PARTIES.

Exhibit "E" was not introduced in evidence as
against Harry Price. Therefore, the only ground that he
can be held under this decree is a purported estoppel.
In Point II of our main brief (P. 38) we have indicated
that there is no estoppel for four good reasons:
1.

There was no oral contract, possession or part
performance.

2.

No representation of an existing fact (our brief,
P. 52).

3.

Any act of Ra varino was not referable to the
contract relied on (our brief, P. 52).

The law on this point is not challenged at all by respondent in his brief. He defaults as to this particular
aspect of this case.
4.

Respondent is not defrauded if specific performanre i~ denied (our brief, P. 54).
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The facts of this matter of estoppel, and the law
cited by respondent is found under Point III of his brief.
None of our arguments under our Point II are answerP-d
by respondent there.
It appears clear then that Harry Price cannot be
bound. This being so, the women are not bound. This
Court is referred to Page 63 of our brief where the law
so holding is set out.
This law and our position in this respect are not
challenged. So, even if Exhibit "E" was the agreement
of the women, it cannot be enforced against them.
Again in attacking this section of respondent's brief,
we direct the Court's attention to our argument beginning at Page 71 of our brief, where we maintain that one
document cannot be plucked from among a number of
documents drawn to represent a deal and be enforced.
This is an answer to Point II of respondent's brief and
this answer is not challenged by respondent in his brief.
If Exhibit "E" was the agreement between the parties as is contended here by respondent, why were the
following acts, all of which a,re admitted, and procedures
carried on by Hansen representing plaintiff and the defendants.
a. The Mollerup abstracts were sent to Ed Jensen
for examination.
b. The Mollerup properties were appraised by Mr.
Schluter.
30
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c. Title perfected to the satisfaction of Ed Jensen
in the Mollerup properties.
d. Deed drawn fr01n Prices to Mollerup.
e. Deed of the Price property drawn and executed
conveying the same by Mollerup to Ravarino.
f. Authority of Ravarino to enter the su1n of $19,000.00 not authorized until three weeks later.
g. If Prices were selling under the terms of Exhibit
"E," why were they required to pay $500.00 cash at the
time Exhibit "E" was executed!
h. vVhat was the necessity of Exhibit "J" being executed!
1. Why were not appellants given a copy of Exhibit
"E"~

Why was Harr·y Price urged to sign up the utilities on the Mollerup property!
k. Why was Hansen, the agent of Ravarino, trying
to get the Prices to accept the ~Iollerup property as late
as December~
l. Why did Mr. Rich interrogate the Bureau of Internal Revenue and present them a factual problem involving this trade 1
m. No deed by Prices and Parr to Ravarino was
ever prepared, or a request for signatures on such an
instrument requested.
J·

No satisfactory explanation is made by respondent
for any of the above acts. None of the1n are consistent
with respondent's theory that Exhibit "E" was the agreement and it is admitted on each side that all of such acts
were done.
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The conclusive factor, in addition to the above, would
seem to be that Exhibit "E," according to its terms,
anticipates that further action by way of real. estate contract or deed would be required in order to give this
Earnest Money Receipt legal effect. But, when the transaction was presented in its final form, there is nothing
whatsoever that gives effect to the terms of Exhibit "E."
The argument made at Page 36 of respondent's brief
is that Ravarino was only concerned with the purchase
of the Price property and that what the Prices did with
the money was of no concern to him. This is not the
evidence in the case and the truth is that the agents of
Ravarino could only acquire the Price property if it could
be traded to Mollerup. Hansen conceded this at the time
his deposition was taken.
Respondent next sets out a number of excerpts from
Mr. Rich's testimony. These generally confirm the theory
of defendants in this action and any question as to what
:M:r. Rich thought this deal to be is removed by his testimony at Pages 155-156 of the record, where he was
asked:
"Q. And by that you Ineant, if you could transfer Price's property for Mollerup's property
there would be no tax to Prices?
"A. That is right.
"Q. 'rhis deal that you drew up, which involved
which is represented by Exhibit F and 0, and
all the papers"A. Yes.
"Q. It was drawn according to your understanding of what the deal was~
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"A.

"Q.

''~-\.

"Q.
"A.

It was drawn aceording to the way the deal
developed and on instructions of Mr. Hansen,
see.
And these docmnPnts, they are the deeds and
various things you testified you had drawn
that affected the proposition in accordance
with vonr instructions?
Fron~ ~Ir. Hansen, yes sir.
* * * *
Then when the final deal came, the down payJnent was to he of the Price property instead
of the cash~
That is right."

No one can say that ~Ir. Rich's understanding of this
proposition was that Exhibit "E" was the agreement, yet
Mr. Rich's testimony is cited for this purpose. If Exhibit "E" was the agreement between the parties there
was no need for ~fr. Rich to be involved in this case
at all or to draw docu1nents as he did.
Respondent next sets out two statements from the
deposition of Mrs. Parr and attempts thereby to warp
her testimony to support this proposition. It is submitted
that l\Irs. Parr corrected any misconception she gave by
these answers in her testimony and by her actions as
testified to by the other witnesses, including ~Ir. Hansen.
The crux of respondent's case is contained in his next
contention where he states that there are two separate
contracts, Exhibit "E" for the sale of the Price property
and Exhibit "J" for the sale of the Mollerup property.
Such a contention is not supported by this record and it
is completely falsf'. fTansen, himself, while under oath
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has testified that it is not the case and all of the facts
listed hereinabove show conclusively that such is not the
case, nor was such contemplated by anyone connected
with it.
After October 5th when Ravarino authorized Hansen to offer $19,000.00, Hansen began to put on the heat
to get Harry Price to act. This act was the signing of the
Uniform Real Estate Contract providing for his purchase of the Mollerup property. This is the only thing
that remained to conclude the whole matter. Evidence
of Hansen's activity in this regard was presented by himself when he states that dozens of phone calls were made
to Jensen and Price, and confirmed by Jensen and Price
themselves. This activity cmnmenced on October 5th and
was still being prosecuted as late as December 11th. So
for two months Price was being subjected to requests to
sign a contract in conformance with a trade, not Exhibit

"E."
How can respondent come before this Court and seriously maintain, as he does in Point II of his brief, "that
Exhibit 'E' was the agree1nent between the parties" when
no document of any kind which gave legal effect to Exhibit "E" was ever prepared or was ever offered to defendants, or any one of them, for their signatures?
Finally we have a situation where a deed to Prices'
property, signed by Mollerup, is in the possession of
Ilansen, representing Ravarino, on August 4th. Hansen
knows this deed is of the Prices' property. If Exhibit
34
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"E" is the agreetnent of these parties, how can this fad
be explained! Did Ravarino or Hansen expect another
deed from the Prices and ~Irs. Parr of the same property? Obviously not. Yet the trial Court, with this
fact staring it in its face, 8ays in it8 findings of fact that
Harry Price and Mrs. Parr agreed to sign a \V al'l·an t)·
Deed to Ravarino for $19,000.00 cash. To reconcile these
two facts results in the most unusual real estate action
ever heard of. Yet, if plaintiff's position is to be maintained, we have a situation where two deeds of the sante
property become necessary: one frmn the record owner
and one fron1 a stranger. Such a condition might be
possible in the hands of novices or children, but inconceivable in this matter which was handled by professional
real estate merchants.
POINT III.
THE FACTS IN THIS CASE DO NOT WARRANT A
FINDING OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL OF HARRY PRICE,
ESPECIALLY AS TO THE TERMS OF EXHIBIT "E".

This question is closely related to the problem of
whether Ravarino purchased the Terry strip in reliance
upon any action of Harry Price. As has been indicated
previously, this was not the case, and this being so, no
question of equitable estoppel can arise because among
other things there was no reliance. This is admitted
inasmuch as the purported change of position, if any,
consists of this fact.
No attempt is made in respondent's brief to refute
the arguments presented in Point II, beginning at Page
38 of appellants' brief, nor has there been any attempt
11""' .

.:>::>· .

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to distinguish the cases cited there. The law cited by respondent consists of general statements from textbooks,
plus isolated excerpts from cases whose facts come nowhere near being similar to those involved in this case.
At the commencement of respondent's argument,
P. 44 he sets out nine numbered facts which is the only
factual argument he makes as to this particular point.
In considering these facts in connection with estoppel,
it must be remembered that the representations or acts
must be legally sufficient and must be made by plaintiff
to the defendant which affects plaintiff's conduct in some
manner. With this introduction these nine propositions
will be discussed.
(1) This statement merely recites the signing of
the listing agreement with Hansen. The price asked was
$35,000.00. It contained no obligation to sell. This document has nothing to do with the case and respondent does
not claim anything for it.
(2) This refers to an admittedly rejected offer and
put Hansen on notice that a trade only was acceptable ·
and that a trade arranged which was all right with Mrs.
Price would be acceptable to Mr. Price. Plaintiff had
no knowledge of this. Such a fact, if true, could not possibly be a basis for an estoppel and this fact in the last
analysis confirms the theory of defendants and the facts
presented by defendants.
(3) This statement affirms the position of defendants, that a trade with Mollerup was contemplated. This
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stateinent adtnits the fact that ~Iollerup's property was
involved in this transaction, and Exhibit "E," by it:-;
terms, has nothing to do whatsoeYer with ~[ollerup or
his property. There is no ele1nent of estoppel involved in
this state1nent.
This state1nent is an absolute mis-statement of
the facts. This record, as has previously been pointed
out, shows only that Mr. Hansen asserts he explained the
provisions of an arrangen1ent or deal to Mrs. Price. The
evidence of Hansen, as has been pointed out, is to the
effect that :Jir. Price had never ~een Exhibit "E" and on
two occasions he testified he did not give the Prices a
copy of Exhibit "E."
(.f)

Plaintiff asserts:
"Every requiren1ent and provision of Exhibit
'E' was explained to and discussed by Mr. Price."
What is there to explain and discuss about a cash sale
for $19,000.00~ How can plaintiff say that a sale for
$19,000.00 cash was made known to llarry Price by his
agent when the agent draws the transaction in its final
form as a trade wherein $18,000.00 credit is allowed on
such trade, and no objection is made to the papers so
drawn.
(5) The state1nent of Paragraph 5 reaches the
limits of inconsistency. It is true abstracts were brought
to date and examined. What connection has the examination of the Mollerup abstract got to do with Exhibit "E"
except to contradict it. If the fact were that Exhibit "E"
was explained to :Mr. Price and he understood it, why was
37
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it necessary for Prices' attorney to examine the Moilerup abstract?
The transaction as explained to him, does not refe!'
to a cash sale under the terms of Exhibit "E," but a
trade. This is still another example of where words
such as "deal," "arrangement," etc., are used by plaintiff
when the true meaning thereof is a trade, but they assunle it means assent to Exhibit "E," which is neve~ the
( 6) Here we have another mis-statement. The deed
from Terry was executed the day after Mollerup executed a deed of the Price property to Ravarino.
In spite of the statement of plaintiff that he delivered the money to Hansen the day he received the Terry
property, with the instructions to Hansen that his offer
was only good for a week, plaintiff argues: "at the same
time plaintiff left with Hansen for delivery to defendants the purchase price for the fifth south property."
Plaintiff says Hansen left with an offer. This assertion
1s a deliberate distortion of plaintiff's statement.
( 7) It is true, the closing documents were prepared
in accordance with the understanding of all. This is the
only statement in this paragraph that is not completely
false. These documents were not approved and possession of the Mollerup property was never taken. No
estoppel arises from this paragraph.
(8) This statement is true, but what relation has
it to any matter of equitable estoppel~ To this statement
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might be added the fact that Ed Jen~Pn ~wore und(lf' oath
that Harry had never told hin1 he had approved the deal,
and his actions in not exrunining the papers fully eonfirm this. On the other hand, Hansen baldly declares that
Ed Jensen told hin1 that Harry Price said everything
was all right. Jensen denies this. Here again Hansen
in one place says that Ed Jensen told hin1 Harry had
approved the deal. At another place he says Ed Jensen
told him Harry Price was dragging his feet. How can
one tell fr01n Hansen's testin1ony what Ed Jensen told
him? It is adn1itted that Hansen called Jensen a nmnber
of times. 'Vhy the calls if everything was all right with
Harry f If a cash deal was involved, why all the telephone calls by Hansen? If a cash deal was involved, what
more was necessary than a deed from Prices and Parr
to Ravarino? Why wasn't such a deed presented? Why
was not an offer to present such a deed made during- ~:u,
whole time from October 5th to December 11th~
This statement is merely to the effect that
Harry Price refused to trade. No element of estoppel
is involved in this paragraph.
(9)

There is absolutely not one fact recited in the nine
paragraphs above commented upon which has anything
to do with equitable estoppel. Setting them out is a deliberate effort to confuse this issue, which is continued
thereafter in respondent's brief by the citation of his
authority.
Each case has been examined and there is not one
whose facts are similar to the situation that exists here.
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A number of citations are taken from Pomeroy. Pomeroy,
himself, in speaking of the use and application of the
broad principles he expounded, advises caution and an
examination of the facts of each case. His thought on thiE:
subject is found in Hilton v. Sloan, (Ut.) 108 P. at 693,
where he says:
"One caution however is necessary and very
important. It would be unsafe and misleading to
rely on these general requisites as applicable to
every case without examining the instances in
which they have been modified or limited."
At Page 51 of plaintiff's brief, he confesses that
his search has discovered no cases exactly like the one
here. Graves v. Godthwait, 26 N.E. 860, cited at Page 43
in appellant's brief, is exactly this case on its facts.
There plaintiff purchased other property relying on defendants' promise to convey the property involved in the
lawsuit. See, also, Knoff v. Grace, 190 P. 526, cited at
Page 44 of appellant's brief. This case is identical in
principle to the case at bar. The law cited at our brief,
Page 44, et seq., on this point, shows conclusively that
any conduct of the promisee must be referable to the
contract being enforced. In other words, it must be conduct in the performance of the contract, rather than reliance upon it. In applying this rule there must first be
an agreement proved. As we pointed out in our original
brief, there is not such an agreement established in this
case. Respondent does not contend that the law is otherwise. Yet, under the admitted facts, a condition exists
~0
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here where the law above eited precludes hin1 from rPcovery.
After exhaustive research, and after exan1ination
of the cases cited by respondent. it can safely be said by
the writer hereof that no case exists which allows specific performance where an anticipatory statement results in acts not in furtherance of the contraet sued upon. The necessary requisites to establish equitable estoppel are contained in Point II of appellants' brief, commencing at Page 38.
Reference will now be made to the authority cited
by appellants' in their brief, conunencing on Page 49.
The first case is Wolf, Administratrix, v. Wallingford Bank and Trust Co., 1 A. 2d 143, 117 A.L.R. 932.
This case was an action at law for damages. Plaintiff
consented to a foreclosure on her property upon the oral
understanding of defendant that after such foreclosure
the property would be reconveyed to plaintiff. No such
reconveyance was made. During the foreclosure plaintiff
made substantial ilnprovements on the house and as the
Court said, "added substantially to the value of the real
estate."
Here there was possession and the con tract on the
part of plaintiff was completely executed. This Court
also indicated that specific performance probably would
not have been granted in this case, hut that inasn1uch as
it was an action for damages the degree of proof was
not as high and plaintiff sustained her burden only to
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the effect that there had been a waiver of the Statute
of Frauds so that a remedy at law was available to her.
The Court in the Wallingford Bank case, above cited,
points out that there is a conflict of authority on the
question of whether an estoppel may be raised to defeat
the statute where a plaintiff has acted solely in reliance
on an oral agreement. It then states that those cases
which follow such a rule limit it to "cases where the statement or promise relates to an intended abandonment of
an existing right and is made to influence others who
have in fact been influenced by it."
The Court goes on to say "the effect of such an eRtoppel as in this case is not to make binding 'promissory
representations as to future action dependent upon a contract to be entered into' which it was said could not be
done in Un.ion MuJual Life Ins. Co. v. Mowry, 96 U.S.
544, 24 L. Ed. 674."
In other words, the Court in the vVallingford Bank
case holds squarely that in no case can anticipatory
promises as to future action be the basis of an estoppel.
All of the purported conduct of Harry Price is admittedly anticipatory.
The next cases cited are five (5) Utah cases, none
of which has a factual situation anywhere near the the
one presently before the Court.

Hilton v. Sloan, 37 Ut. 359. This is the case of John
R. Park and his wife referred to in the argmnent. This
Court held that Mrs. Hilton, the plaintiff, was estopped
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from asserting her dower right against the estate of 1\Ir.
Park or his grantees after she had expressly, and in
writing, waived such existing right and represented to
the community for years that she wa~ not, nor had she
ever been, his wife, but was the wife of Mr. Hilton, to
whom she bore ten (10) children. rrhere was no feature
of an anticipatory prmnise in the Hilton rase.
The next is Kerr u. Hillyard, 51 Ft. 364. In this case
the promisee had fully executed his contract. The Statute of Frauds was raised to defeat the authority of the
agent, but the contract of agency had been fully executed
and the Court held that the Statute of Frauds had nothing to do with the case.
Ta'YI!Yter v. Provo Reservoir Co., 76 Ut. 335, was a

case where plaintiff attempted to ntake defendent irrigation company change the course of a canal after 26 years
acquiescence in a previous change. Plaintiff had been a
party to a petition for the previous change and it would
have cost the canal company $30,000.00 to make the
change at this late date. The Court held that the plaintiff
in this position was estopped to enforce a written agreement 26 years old in the face of his acquiescence.
Bamberger Co. v. Certified Productions, Inc., 88 Ut.
194, is a case where the Statute of Frauds was raised hy

plaintiff when defendant tried to alter the terms of a
written lease. The change in the lease had been fully
performed by the defendant at great expense and the
Court held that the subject matter of _the original lease
43
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had not been changed, but that only the method of performing it.
Latses v. Niclc Floor, Inc., 99 Ut. 214, is a case involving a lease. Plaintiff maintained the original lease
was not authorized. The Court held there was apparent
authority for the execution of such lease and, in any
event, the original term of the lease had been performed.
This case involved the option for extension of this lease.
In that case the lease agreement had been fully performed by defendant and substantial improvements had been
made under the terms thereof which entitled defendant
to such an extension.
The next cases cited are, Vogel v. Shaw, 294 P. 687,
and Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578. These cases
are in line with those cited by appellants in their brief.
In these cases the promisee purchases land in pursuance
of the promise or agreement of the promissor. The
promisee in each instance intentionally waives and aba;ndons an existing right, and in ea.ch case the promisee
has executed his part of the arrangement at great expense
to himself, which would amount to fraud. There is
positively no anticipatory promise in either of these
cases, as their facts clearly indicate.
The case of Boelter v. Blake, 12 N.W. 2d 327, is cited
at Page 56 of respondent's brief and is quoted from extensively. In that case there was possession and the
Court found there had been substantial part performance
of the oral agreement sued upon and actual acquiescence
44
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in such perfortnance with knowledge by the wife without
objection from her. There was no pr01nise to perform a
future act and the perfor1nance of the promisee was of
the oral agremnent, involving the property in litigation
not in other property, as i~ the case here.

A conm1on fact in all cases where the doctrine of
estoppel has been applied is that the evidence of such has
been clear and convincing. Over and over again respondent in his brief states that Hansen testified that
Price
"Unequivocally and definitely stated that he
would go along with the deal and to go ahead and
purchase the Terry property."
The "deal" that is referred to is the trade arrangement, not a cash sale. Nowhere in this record has Hansen testified that Harry Price stated to him that he would
sell his property to Ravarino for $19,000.00 cash. And
he didn't testify as stated by respondent at all.
The attention of the Court is directed to Pages 87
and 88 of this record which contain the testimony of Hansen on this point. r.l1 his is all Hansen has to say:
"Now it looks like everything is okeh. * * * I
told Harry that and then after the first part of
September, or the last part of September, I told
him we were ready to close that now and I wanted
to be sure there wouldn't be any trouble. "" "" • He
said that's fine, go ahead."
He merely testified that Price said it was alright
with him for Hansen to buy the Terry strip.
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There is no question in this case that the word "it"
and the "deal" to be closed with the Prices was the trade.
How can it be said that such language amounts to an unequivocal promise and conforms to the rule that an oral
statement to be enforced must be clear, unequivocal and
convincing, especially in view of the fact that the overwhelming weight of the evidence is completely opposed
to such conversation ever being made by Mr. Price, anyway.
The purchase of the Terry strip was not induced by
Harry Price, but, on the other hand, the purchase of the
Terry strip under the evidence in this case was used as
a lever to force the Prices and Mrs. Parr to go through
with this trade in spite of the differences that existed between the Prices and Mollerup as to the terms of their
trade. This is illustrated by the following facts that
are admitted:
a. As early as August 8th, Hansen had signed Ravarino to an offer to purchase the Terry strip.
This indicates that Ravarino wanted the Price property together with the right of way at the rear before
anything was presented to the Prices, and that Hansen,
as his agent, was instructed to obtain both parcels. Nothing that Harry Price had ever done had provoked this
action on the part of Ravarino.
b. Hansen had told Mrs. Price prior to her signing
any papers that Ravarino had purchased the Terry
strip. This is conclusively shown by her statement and
4()

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the fact that this information was imparted to Mr.
Schluter at the time of his appraisal and could only have
been made for the purpose of forcing the Prices to dispose of their property because railroad trackage to the
rear was no longer available to the1n so that their property had become less valuable.
c. The Terry strip was not purchased until a deed
from :Jiollerup of the Price property to Ravarino had
been delivered to Hansen, so that all that remained in
order for everything to go as planned was that the documents representing the trade be executed. It was at this
point in the proceedings that it becan1e ilnportant that
the Prices and "Jlrs. Parr go through with the trade,
and it was for this reason that Ravarino offered to raise
his price $1,000.00. However, the matter of this additional $1,000.00 was never brought to the attention of the
Prices, i.e., they were never advised that they would he
allowed another $1,000.00 credit if they went through
with the trade, or, they may have done so, and no law
suit would have resulted.
d. The admitted fact is that I-Iansen frantically
tried to get the Prices and ~frs. Parr to consummate
this trade from the fore part of October clear into December, for over a rnonth after this action was filed.
Plaintiff argues in this section of his brief that he
is defrauded because he has not received the benefit of
his bargain. The cases cited in our brief commencing
at Page 55 indicate clearly that this does not constitute
fraud, nor is it any ground for the granting of specific
47
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performance. The illustration set out on Page 58 conclusively disposes of this argument.
They then accuse defendants of being unfair in offering to restore the price of the Terry strip, by statements
on Page 56 of their brief, in a pure attempt to confuse
the issue. If the full purchase price of the Terry property is repaid is not the commission paid, and wherein
has Ravarino lost the use of $19,000.00~ The only loss of
money in bringing this law suit is lost to the Prices and
Mrs. Parr.
By this argument at Page 56, respondent, at this late
date, is trying to inject into this lawsuit purely foreign
matters. If plaintiff was damaged, the matter should
have been pleaded and proved in this lawsuit. This Court
must assume that if plaintiff was prejudiced in any manner that such would have been presented to the trial
Court. Nothing of this nature was presented and the
facts presented in this argument are wholly without support. See Richardson v. Taylor Land and Livestock
Co. (Wash.), 171 P. 2d 703.
Finally, respondent tries to give this Court the impression that it was months later that Prices offered to
repay Ravarino for the money he expended in purchasing the Terry strip. This is not the case and the record
does not so show. The fact is, that such an offer was
made through November and December of 1950 while
efforts were being made to adjust the matters between
Prices and :Mollerup.
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CONCLUSION
The brief of respondent has not been addressed, nor
has it in any way n1et the arguments presented in appellants' brief. Respondent repeats over and over the fact
that all parties knew what the deal was. rrhey then try
to argue that this deal is a sale for a cash price of
$19,000.00. Nowhere in this record is there evidence
that anyone knew of such a transaction being the deal.
Plaintiff's representative accepted a deed of Prices'
property from ~Iollerup on October 4th. This deed is an
exhibit. How then cm1 they maintain that they are
entitled to another deed fron1 Prices and Mrs. Parr
as a part of this transaction 1 The trial Court has ~o
held and in its doing so has committed a graYe, serious
and expensive injustice to these defendants.

In Section I of our original brief, P. 22, we demonstrated that there was no contract and why there was
no contract, i.e., there was no offer or acceptance. This
argument and the authorities cited are not controverted
by respondent. To say that Harry Price "assented"
does not answer this argt1n1ent.
Under Point II of our original brief, P. 38, we pointed out that there was no part performance or fraud
involved and that this case cmnes within the Statute of
Frauds. This contention has not been challenged. The
legal aspects of this problem should be resolved in appellants' favor.
In Point III of our brief, P. 60, three legal proposition were presented :
49
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1. That Harry Price is not bound so the women
are not. Nothing is cited in respondent's brief to controvert the legal authority cited on this point.
2. That Exhibit "E" is uncertain. The reading of
this document in view of all the facts and transaction
as contemplated by all, leads to no other conclusion.
3. We point out that you cannot take one document
which does not represent the transaction and have such
document enforced. No law is cited by respondent to controvert this proposition and its truth is obvious from the
factual standpoint based on this record.
In Point IV of our brief, P. 81, we direct the Court's
attention to the Inisapprehension and mistake, setting
forth eight facts which conclusively prove this point.
These fttcts are enlarged in this brief. The law presented
under this point has not been controverted or discussed
by respondent.
The documents prepared and executed show that the
Terry strip was bought on October 5th by Ravarino.
Ravarino, the plaintiff in this action, stated unequivocally that on this same day he made an offer to Price
to buy for $19,000.00. The trial Court is obliged to find
this fact, and this one fact conclusively disposes of any
equitable estoppel inasmuch as the purchase of the Terry
strip is the only act pleaded or proved in support of such
theory.
The Court by this judgment has made a contract
for these people. It is a contract never intended by anyone. (See our Brief, Page 60, et seq.)
50
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And, finally, the inequity of this decision can be
startingly demonstrated by the fact that a reputable
banker appraised the one warehouse lot for $20,000.00.
Under this decision these defendants are required to part
with both lots for $19,000.00. It is submitted that such a
result is totally unwarranted under the facts of this
case and the evidence presented to the trial Court.
As compared to this unequitable result, plaintiff
was not defrauded in 1950 by anything defendants said
or did, and the same is true as of today. In other words,
he has never been victi1nized at all. On the other hand,
defendants have undergone the expense of an extended
trial and appeal, in addition to losing their property
for a wholly inadequate price. This situation represents the equities involved.
The fact still re1nains that if this deal had been
signed up by all parties concerned in October, as contemplated, $1,000.00 found its way into the pocket of
Lewis Hansen unbeknowns to anyone. The document
that permitted this is Exhibit '"E," which was seen only
by Hansen and possibly by Ravarino in it:-; present form.
This is the contract enforced herein and the only purpose for its execution was to effect the above result.
We earnestly urge that this case be decided according to what happened, rather than in accordance and
in furtherance of this scheme of Lewis Hansen.
Respectfully submitted,
~IULLINER,

PRINCE & !1:ULLINER,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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